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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
This interlocutory appeal involves two questions: 
1) whether we have jurisdiction of it, and 2)  whether an 
individual is precluded from being a "seaman" for purposes 
of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.  668, if his relationship with a 
barge/diving station in question is only 10 days in 
duration. On the first issue, we will deny appellee/third- 
party defendant, Breakwaters International, Inc.'s, motion 
to dismiss the appeal. We find that the pleadings and 
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actions of the parties were sufficient to invoke admiralty 
jurisdiction for purposes of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(h). We, 
therefore, have jurisdiction of this appeal of a non-final 
order under 28 U.S.C.  1292(a)(3). On the second issue, 
the district court held that Layne Foulk, a freelance 
commercial diver, had insufficient durational connections 
to the barge to be considered a "seaman" covered by the 
Jones Act. Foulk v. Donjon Marine Co, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 
692, 698 (D.N.J. 1997). We do not agree and will reverse. 
 
I. Facts 
 
In April 1993, the Borough of Avalon, New Jersey, 
contracted with Breakwaters to erect an artificial reef off 
Avalon's coast. Breakwaters contracted with Donjon to 
provide material, barges, tugs, and a floating crane barge. 
Breakwaters hired freelance divers, including Foulk, to 
perform some of the work. Construction began on July 10, 
1993, under Breakwaters' direction. Donjon's crane barge, 
the Farrell 256, anchored 150 feet offshore, was used both 
to install the reef and as a dive station for the dive crew, 
consisting of Foulk and three other commercial divers who 
were to assist in the placement of the reef. As dive station, 
the barge held air compressors, a communications box, and 
other diving equipment. The dive crew were to sleep ashore 
and to report to the barge by motor launch each morning. 
Foulk was hired to work for 10 days, the duration of the 
project. On his first day of work, Foulk was injured when, 
while in the water, he was caught between a jetty and the 
clamshell bucket operated by the barge crane. He suffered 
various fractures, a collapsed lung and an injured right 
shoulder. 
 
On January 6, 1995, while on disability, Foulk and his 
wife, Marjorie, filed suit against Donjon and Breakwaters, 
sounding in negligence and general maritime law. The 
Foulks alleged both diversity and admiralty jurisdiction. On 
February 14, 1995, before any answer was filed, the Foulks 
amended their complaint to name only Donjon as defendant 
on claims of negligence and of the unseaworthiness of 
Donjon's vessel. Jurisdiction was once again grounded in 
both diversity and admiralty. On March 10, 1995, Donjon 
filed both an answer and a third-party claim against 
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Breakwaters for indemnity and contribution. On June 1, 
1995, the Magistrate Judge granted Donjon's oral motion to 
amend its third-party complaint to make a claim against 
Breakwaters in favor of the Foulks, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 14(c). Breakwaters did not object to this amendment. 
The parties subsequently submitted a joint pre-trial order 
which stated inter alia, that "jurisdiction of the Court arises 
under the Admiralty Law as modified by the Jones Act, 46 
U.S.C.  668." Breakwaters sought partial summary 
judgment on its contention that Foulk was not a "seaman" 
under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.  688. Donjon and Foulk 
cross-moved for partial summary judgment that Foulk was 
a Jones Act "seaman." On April 9, 1997, the District Court 
granted Breakwaters' motion and denied Donjon and 
Foulk's motion to the contrary. Foulk v. Donjon Marine Co, 
Inc., 961 F. Supp. 692, 698 (D.N.J. 1997). Donjon and the 
Foulks filed notices of interlocutory appeal on April 21, 
1997, and April 30, 1997, respectively. 28 U.S.C. 
 1292(a)(3). On May 9, 1997, Breakwatersfiled a motion to 
dismiss the appeal. For the reasons set forth below, we will 
deny Breakwaters motion to dismiss, and, considering the 
merits of the appeal, we will reverse the district court grant 
of partial summary judgment in favor of Breakwaters. 
 
II. Jurisdiction 
 
Before we reach the merits of this appeal, we mustfirst 
resolve Breakwaters' motion to dismiss it. Donjon asserts 
that the jurisdictional basis for its interlocutory appeal is 
28 U.S.C.  1292(a)(3)1 which provides in part: 
 
       [T]he court of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals 
       from: 
 
       (3) Interlocutory decrees of such district courts or 
       the judges thereof determining the rights and 
       liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases in which 
       appeals from final decrees are allowed. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Donjon concedes that 28 U.S.C.  1291 is inapplicable as a basis for 
jurisdiction because there was no "final judgment" of the district court. 
Appellant Donjon's Br. in Opp. to Appellee Breakwater's Mot. to Dismiss, 
at 11; See United States v. Brook Contracting Corp., 759 F.2d 320 (3d 
Cir. 1985). 
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To use  1292(a)(3) as a basis for appellate jurisdiction of 
an interlocutory order, such as a grant of partial summary 
judgment, a plaintiff must be asserting an admiralty or 
maritime claim within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(h). 
This Rule states as follows: 
 
       A pleading or count setting forth a claim for relief 
       within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction that is 
       also within the jurisdiction of the district court on 
       some other ground may contain a statement identifying 
       the claim as an admiralty or maritime claim for the 
       purposes of Rules 14(c), 38(e), 82 and the Supplemental 
       Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims. If the 
       claim is cognizable only in admiralty, it is an admiralty 
       or maritime claim for those purposes whether so 
       identified or not. . . . The reference in [28 U.S.C. 
        1292(a)(3)] to admiralty cases shall be construed to 
       mean admiralty and maritime cases within the 
       meaning of this subdivision [Fed. R. Civ. P. 9](h). 
 
(emphasis added). 
 
In both its initial complaint against Breakwaters and 
Donjon and in its First Amended Complaint against only 
Donjon, Foulk asserted two bases for subject-matter 
jurisdiction: admiralty and diversity.2  When a federal 
plaintiff makes a claim in admiralty or joins an admiralty 
claim with another claim, certain special procedures and 
rules apply: Rules 14(c), 38(e), 82, the Supplemental Rules 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The First Complaint states: 
 
       The jurisdiction of this Court arises under the Admiralty law by 
the 
       Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.  688, and the diversity jurisdiction of the 
       Court, 28 U.S.C.  1332, the amount in controversy being in excess 
       of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00) exclusive of interest and 
       costs. 
 
Compl. and Jury Demand,  5. The First Amended Complaint states: 
 
       The jurisdiction of this Court arises under the Admiralty law and 
       the diversity jurisdiction of the Court, 28 U.S.C. 1332, the 
amount 
       in controversy being in excess of Fifty Thousand Dollars 
       ($50,000.00) exclusive of interest and costs. 
 
First Am. Compl. and Jury Demand,  4. 
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for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, and 28 U.S.C. 
 1292(a)(3). Rule 9(h) helps clarify the applicability of these 
admiralty and maritime rules and procedures in a case 
where more than one basis for subject matter jurisdiction 
has been asserted. To assist the court and the parties in 
recognizing the presence of an admiralty claim in a multi- 
claim suit, Rule 9(h) provides that the complaint "may 
contain a statement identifying the claim as an admiralty or 
maritime claim ... ." See Fedorczyk v. Caribbean Cruise 
Lines, Ltd., 82 F.3d 69, 73 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
Breakwaters grounds its motion to dismiss the appeal on 
the fact that, in asserting admiralty jurisdiction in both the 
original and the amended complaints, the Foulks do not 
specifically cite to Rule 9(h) and, as a consequence, do not 
"identify the pleading as an admiralty claim." For this 
reason, Breakwaters contends that the Foulks did not 
invoke admiralty jurisdiction and cannot employ the 
procedures associated with it, including the use of 28 
U.S.C.  1292(a)(3), the jurisdictional basis for this appeal. 
As a result, Breakwaters asserts that section 1292(a)(3) is 
inapplicable and that this appeal must be dismissed for 
lack of jurisdiction. 
 
The issue that we must resolve is how specific a party 
must be in identifying an admiralty claim in a complaint 
when that party is pleading alternative theories of subject 
matter jurisdiction. Generally, under the liberal notice 
pleading practices in federal civil cases, a claimant "does 
not have to set out in detail the facts upon which the claim 
for relief is based, but must merely provide a statement 
sufficient to put the opposing party on notice of the claim." 
2 Moore's Federal Practice,  8.04[1] (Matthew Bender 3d 
ed. 1988); see Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 
78-79 (1984); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) 
(pleading must contain only a short and plain statement 
sufficient to give notice); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Similarly, the 
claimant must include "a short and plain statement of the 
grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends." Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1). Plaintiff's complaints, see n.2, both clearly 
stated two jurisdictional bases: diversity and admiralty. 
 
There are, however, embellishments to the Rule 8 notice 
pleading provisions. One of these is Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(h) 
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which explains that a party in Foulk's position, who has set 
forth two jurisdictional bases, "may" include a "statement 
identifying the claim as an admiralty or maritime claim." 
(emphasis added). By affirmatively including such a 
statement, a party clearly describes a claim as being one in 
admiralty. See Advisory Committee Notes, Fed. R. Civ. P. 9, 
1966 Amendment ("the preferable solution [for designating 
a claim as an admiralty claim] is to allow the pleader who 
now has power to determine procedural consequences by 
filing a suit in admiralty to exercise that power under 
unification ... by a simple statement in his pleading to the 
effect that the claim is an admiralty or maritime claim."); cf. 
Fedorczyk, 82 F.3d at 73 (stating that "[t]o invoke admiralty 
jurisdiction ... a plaintiff must affirmatively insert a 
statement in the pleadings identifying the claim as an 
`admiralty or maritime claim'."). 
 
A direct citation to Rule 9(h) is unambiguous and may be 
considered by some to be preferable. See Wright & Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d  1211 (West 
1990); Fed. R. Civ. P. Forms 2(d).3 However, nothing in 
Rule 9(h) restricts the invocation of admiralty jurisdiction to 
a specific citation to that rule. Indeed, Rule 9(h)'s use of the 
word "may," instead of "must," suggests that the specific 
use of the words "Rule 9(h)" is not required. 
 
We conclude then that a plaintiff, invoking admiralty 
jurisdiction, does not need to make direct reference to 
Rule 9(h). The question remains, however, just how specific 
a reference to admiralty jurisdiction must be in order to 
invoke it. Our review of the facts of the present case 
convinces us that the pleadings, along with the parties' 
actions, are sufficient to invoke it. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In fact a number of district courts have so held. See, e.g., Subaru 
Distributors Corp. v. General Ship Corp., 167 F.R.D. 342, 343 (D. Mass 
1996); Lewis v. United States, 812 F.Supp. 620, 628 (E.D. Va. 1993); 
Siragusa v. Standard Steamship Owners Protection, 710 F.Supp. 404, 
407 (D.P.R. 1989); Banks v. Hanover Steamship Corp., 43 F.R.D. 374, 
376-7 (D.Md. 1967). By contrast, the Fifth Circuit has held to the 
contrary, that explicit reference to Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(h) is not 
necessary. 
Teal v. Eagle Fleet, Inc., 933 F.2d 341, 345 (5th Cir. 1991); T.N.T. 
Marine 
Service, Inc. v. Weaver Shipyards and Dry Docks, Inc., 702 F.2d 585, 
587-88 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 151 (1983). 
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Shortly after defendant/third-party plaintiff Donjonfiled 
its third-party complaint against Breakwaters for indemnity 
and contribution, the magistrate judge granted Donjon's 
oral motion to amend its third-party complaint to reflect 
that it was seeking a claim for judgment against 
Breakwaters in favor of plaintiffs pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 14(c). See Order Amending Third Party Complaint, June 
1, 1995. A third party claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(c) can 
only be made with respect to admiralty claims as 
contemplated under Rule 9(h). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(c) 
("When a plaintiff asserts an admiralty or maritime claim 
within the meaning of Rule 9(h), the defendant or claimant, 
as a third party plaintiff, may bring in a third party 
defendant who may be . . .liable. . . by way of remedy over, 
contribution or otherwise on account of the same 
transaction . . .."); Teal v. Eagle Fleet, Inc., 933 F.2d 341, 
344 n.1 (5th Cir. 1991) ("Third party claims under 
Rule 14(c) are only available in admiralty or maritime 
claims."). Donjon's Rule 14(c) claim, then, made it clear to 
all parties that this case would proceed, in part at least, as 
an admiralty claim.4 
 
Furthermore, the parties' manifestation of intent to 
proceed under admiralty jurisdiction was confirmed by the 
final pre-trial order, entered with the consent of 
Breakwaters, which stated that admiralty alone was the 
basis for jurisdiction. See Joint Final Pre-Trial Order ("The 
jurisdiction of the Court arises under Admiralty Law as 
modified by the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. Section 688."; see also 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The dissent argues that "actions by a defendant should not control the 
question of whether a plaintiff meant to invoke admiralty jurisdiction." 
Dissent at 22. We do not suggest that defendant-third party plaintiff 
Donjon was single-handedly able to invoke admiralty procedure on 
behalf of plaintiff; rather that because no parties objected to Donjon's 
motion, it became clear that all parties tacitly agreed to pursue an 
admiralty claim, and that this case would proceed, at least in part, as 
such. Moreover the fact that the plaintiffs joined in the Pretrial Order 
and are now appellants before us on this interlocutory appeal further 
demonstrates that they are cognizant of the invocation of admiralty 
jurisdiction. The dissent's ensuing cite makes clear that actions of the 
plaintiff are relevant to what jurisdiction the plaintiff has invoked. 
Dissent at 22 citing Bryan v. Associated Container Transp., 837 F.Supp. 
633, 641 (D.N.J. 1993). 
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Fedorczyk, 82 F.3d at 73 (holding that the district court did 
not have admiralty jurisdiction and noting that the district 
court had entered a pretrial order, stating that the 
"jurisdictional predicate" was diversity of citizenship, 
without objection from any party (including appellant 
Fedorczyk who was arguing in favor of admiralty 
jurisdiction)). Having concluded that the parties' pleadings 
and actions were sufficient to invoke admiralty jurisdiction, 
we have jurisdiction to hear Foulks' and Donjon's 
interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  1292(a)(3). 
 
III. Seaman Status 
 
Turning to the merits of the appeal, Foulk and Donjon 
argue that the District Court erred in granting partial 
summary judgment on the issue of Layne Foulk's seaman 
status under the Jones Act. The Jones Act provides a cause 
of action in negligence for "any seaman" injured "in the 
course of his employment." 46 U.S.C.  688. There are two 
components to "seaman" status. See McDermott Int'l Inc., v. 
Wilander, 111 S.Ct. 807, 813 (1991); Chandris, Inc. v. 
Latsis, 115 S.Ct. 2172 (1995). First, the "employee's duties" 
must "contribut[e] to the function[ing] of the vessel or to the 
accomplishment of its mission." Chandris, 115 S.Ct. at 
2190. Second, the worker's "connection to the "vessel in 
navigation" must be "substantial in terms of both its 
duration and its nature." Id. The district court found that 
while the first requirement was met, as a matter of law, the 
second requirement could not be met and thus granted 
partial summary judgment to Breakwaters. Foulk, 961 
F.Supp. at 698. The district court reasoned that Foulk's 
10-day assignment was temporary and, therefore, not of 
sufficient duration to satisfy the Chandris "substantial 
duration" requirement. Id. ("Ten days (excluding nights), 
with no view towards a more permanent relationship, is 
simply too short a duration to satisfy the Chandris 
durational requirement for seaman status."). We review the 
district court grant of summary judgment5  de novo. See 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The standard for summary judgment is well settled: "Summary 
judgment is appropriate when the admissible evidence fails to 
demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is 
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Semper v. Johnson and Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 727 (3d Cir. 
1995). 
 
The Jones Act fails to define the term "seaman." 46 
U.S.C.  688. In 1927, Congress provided some content to 
the Jones Act seaman requirement by passing the 
Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act 
(LHWCA). 33 U.S.C.  901-950. The LHWCA provides the 
exclusive remedy for land-based maritime workers and 
excludes from its purview "a master or member of a crew of 
any vessel." 33 U.S.C.  902(3)(G). The Jones Act and 
LHWCA are mutually exclusive. Because eligibility under 
the LHWCA precludes eligibility under the Jones Act, 
"master or member of a crew" must be seen as a refinement 
of the term "seaman" in the Jones Act. Harbor Tug and 
Barge Co. v. Papai, 117 S.Ct. 1535, 1538 (1997); McDermott 
Int'l Inc., v. Wilander, 111 S.Ct. 807, 813 (1991). 
 
More recently, the Supreme Court has provided a 
framework from which to analyze "seaman" status for 
purposes of the Jones Act, providing two essential 
requirements. See McDermott Int'l, 111 S.Ct. at 813; 
Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 115 S.Ct. 2172 (1995). First, the 
worker's duty must be to contribute to the functioning of 
the vessel, and second, the worker's connection to the 
vessel must be "substantial in terms of both its duration 
and nature." Chandris, 115 S.Ct. at 2190. The Court 
explained that the purpose of the "seaman" requirement is 
to "separate the sea-based maritime employees who are 
entitled to Jones Act protection from those land-based 
workers who have only a transitory or sporadic connection 
to a vessel in navigation," reserving seaman status for those 
who are regularly exposed to the perils of the sea. Id. The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P 56(c). When, as 
here, the nonmoving party bears the burden of persuasion at trial, the 
moving party may meet its burden on summary judgment by showing 
that the nonmoving party's evidence is insufficient to carry that burden. 
The nonmoving party creates a genuine issue of material fact if he 
provides sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find for him at 
trial. We give the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable 
inferences." Wetzel v. Tucker, No. 97-7207, slip op. at 4, n.2 (3d Cir. 
Mar. 23, 1998) (citations omitted). 
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Court made clear that the "total circumstances of an 
individual's employment must be weighed to determine 
whether he had a sufficient relation to the . . . vessels." Id. 
 
Furthermore, the issue of seaman status is a mixed 
question of fact and law. Id. Once the court defines the 
appropriate standard, the trier of fact must decide whether 
a particular employee meets that standard and is thus a 
seaman. Id.; Griffith v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 521 
F.2d 31, 36-37 (3d Cir. 1975). "Nevertheless,`summary 
judgment . . . is mandated where the facts and the law will 
reasonably support only one conclusion." Harbor Tug, 117 
S.Ct. at 1540. The District Court granted Breakwaters' 
motion for partial summary judgment on seaman status, 
reasoning that the facts and the law support only the 
conclusion that Foulk was not a seaman. We do not agree. 
 
There is no question that Foulk met the first requirement 
-- he contributed to the functioning of the vessel and to the 
accomplishment of its mission. As the district court found, 
the mission of the vessel in question, the Farrell 256, was 
the installation of an artificial reef. Foulk, 961 F.Supp. at 
696. Foulk was employed as a diver whose duty it was to 
aid in the installation of the reef. See Wilander, 111 S.Ct. 
at 817 ("It is not necessary that a seaman aid in navigation 
or contribute to the transportation of the vessel, but a 
seaman must be doing the ship's work."). 
 
There is also no question that Foulk met the first part of 
the second requirement -- his connection to the vessel was 
substantial in nature. As the district court found, Foulk 
and the dive crew were necessary for the successful 
completion of the Farrell 256's project -- the construction 
of the artificial reef. Foulk, 961 F.Supp. at 697. 
Furthermore, the profession of commercial diving is 
maritime in nature as it cannot be done on land. Wallace 
v. Oceaneering Int'l, 727 F.2d 427436 (5th Cir. 1984). 
Commercial divers are regularly exposed to the perils of the 
sea, the protection from which was the purpose of the 
Jones Act seaman requirement. Chandris, 115 S.Ct. at 
2190. 
 
There is a question, however, whether Foulk met the 
second part of the second requirement -- that Foulk's 
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connection to the Farrell 256 was substantial in duration. 
Foulk had worked alongside the Farrell 256 on the Avalon 
reef project for only half a day when he was injured. 
Nevertheless, under the "no snapshot" doctrine, articulated 
in Chandris, a court does not evaluate a worker's 
connection to a vessel or fleet at the moment of injury. 
Instead, the court must consider his intended relationship, 
as if he had completed his mission uninjured. 115 S.Ct. at 
2187, 2191-92. The contemplated arrangement between 
Foulk and the Farrell 256 was for 10 days' work. Thus, 
under the "no snapshot" doctrine, 10 days, not a few hours, 
is the appropriate durational measure. 
 
The question then is whether Foulk qualifies as a Jones 
Act "seaman" when his durational connection to the Farrell 
256 was only 10 days, i.e,. whether 10 days is sufficient for 
"substantial duration." The district court found that, as a 
matter of law, a 10 day relationship was too short to satisfy 
the Chandris durational requirement. Foulk, 961 F.Supp. at 
698.6 
 
We conclude that the durational element cannot be 
answered by an absolute measure. It is the temporal 
element and the nature of the activities performed that, 
taken together, determine seaman status. Chandris, 115 
S.Ct. at 2190-91. While the Supreme Court did adopt "the 
centerpiece of the formulation used by the Court of 
Appeals" in that case (the two-part test), and did find it 
"important that a seaman's connection to a vessel. . . be 
substantial in both respects (duration and nature)," id. at 
2191, the Court specifically rejected "the temptation to 
create detailed tests to effectuate the congressional 
purpose, tests that tend to become ends in and of 
themselves." Id. at 2190. To define substantial duration by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The district court cited, as relevant points in arriving at its 
decision, 
the fact that Foulk went out to the diving barge each morning and went 
home each evening; he did not eat breakfast or supper and he did not 
sleep on board the barge. Foulk, 961 F.Supp. at 698. Nevertheless, 
where Foulk ate or slept had nothing to do with the performance of his 
duties. Nor did the location where Foulk ate or slept in any way affect 
the maritime nature of his duties. For that reason, we will look at the 
duration of the job as ten days, without subtracting for the nights on 
shore. 
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an absolute number would be to create such a test. The 
ultimate inquiry is "whether the worker in question is a 
member of the vessel's crew or simply a land-based 
employee who happens to be working on the vessel at a 
given time," id. at 2191, and the two-part test is merely an 
aid in making that determination. So while the Court did 
explain that both the duration and the nature of the 
connections be "substantial," id., the inquiry is one in the 
totality of circumstances. Id. at 2190. It is inappropriate to 
attempt to determine the minimum durational element by 
an absolute number, such as 10 days. 
 
Furthermore, this reasoning is consistent with this 
court's holding that "lack of long-continued[durational] 
attachment to a vessel cannot, as a matter of law, serve to 
deny [Jones Act] seaman status to an employee who is 
injured while assigned to and performing normal crew 
service." Reeves v. Mobile Dredging & Pumping Co. Inc., 26 
F.3d 1247, 1252 (3d Cir. 1994) citing with approval Latsis 
v. Chandris, Inc., 20 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 1994) aff'd 115 S.Ct. 
2172. Although pre-Chandris, this court in Reeves was 
cognizant of the "permanence" requirement that required a 
worker's assignment to be substantial in duration, the 
holding eventually reached by the Supreme Court in 
Chandris. Our holding in Reeves that the lack of long 
attachment to a vessel cannot deny seaman status as a 
matter of law remains effective post-Chandris. Here, Foulk 
was clearly performing the "normal crew service" of the 
Farrell 256 -- installation of the artificial reef. The fact that 
he was only going to do it for 10 days does not, by itself, 
mandate summary judgment. Ten days is not a "clearly 
inadequate temporal connection to vessels in navigation, 
sufficient to take the question from the jury by granting 
summary judgment." See, e.g. Palmer v. Fayard Moving and 
Transportation Corp., 930 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1991). A jury 
could reasonably find that an employee's connections to a 
vessel are substantial in both duration and nature even if 
the duration contemplated is 10 days. The analysis of 
seaman status, and ultimately of whether an employee's 
connections are substantial in duration and nature, may 
include a multiplicity of factors. See, e.g., Betrand v. 
International Mooring & Marine, Inc., 700 F.3d 240 (5th Cir. 
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1983) cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1069 (1984). The contemplated 
number of days of employment is only one of these factors. 
 
Consequently, we will reverse the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment on seaman status and remand the case 
to the district court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The dissent comments on the implications of this opinion vis-a-vis 
plaintiffs' demand for a jury trial. Dissent at 23. We do not pass on this 
question as it is not presently before us at this interlocutory appeal of 
a 
grant of partial summary judgment. If this question were to come up at 
a later date, it would of course be governed by relevant legal precedent 
including Fitzgerald v. United States Line Co. , 83 S.Ct. 1646 (1963) and 
Haskins v. Point Towing Co., 395 F.2d 737 (3d Cir. 1968). 
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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
I respectfully dissent from my colleagues' determination 
that this court has jurisdiction to hear this interlocutory 
appeal. Because I dissent on jurisdictional grounds, I do 
not reach the substantive issue raised on the appeal. 
 
An interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C.  1292(a)(3) is 
appropriate only in a case based on admiralty jurisdiction. 
When a complaint sets forth allegations potentially 
cognizable under both the admiralty and non-admiralty 
jurisdiction of the district court, it must contain a 
statement identifying the claim as one in admiralty in order 
to invoke the district court's admiralty jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C.  1333. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(h). This designation 
is significant, because claims arising under admiralty 
jurisdiction to some degree involve different procedures 
from claims at law, not the least of which is the denial of 
a jury trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(e); In re Consolidation 
Coal Co., 123 F.3d 126, 132 (3d Cir. 1997). In determining 
whether the plaintiff made the admiralty jurisdiction 
election, courts must look to the face of the complaint to 
see if it contains the appropriate jurisdictional allegations. 
See Heilman v. United States, 731 F.2d 1104, 1111 (3d Cir. 
1984). 
 
In the present case, the initial complaint states that "[t]he 
jurisdiction of this Court arises under the Admiralty law as 
modified by the Jones Act, 46 USC  688, and the diversity 
jurisdiction of the Court, 28 USC 1332 . . . ." Complaint 
at 2. The language in the first amended complaint parallels 
this allegation, but omits the reference to the Jones Act, 
instead stating that the court's jurisdiction "arises under 
the Admiralty law and the diversity jurisdiction of the 
Court, 28 USC 1332 . . . ." First Amended Complaint at 1. 
The reason for this omission of the Jones Act allegation is 
that the Foulks dropped their Jones Act claim against 
Breakwaters, Layne B. Foulk's employer. The initial 
complaint and the first amended complaint also contain a 
demand for a jury trial, a right which the Foulks preserved 
in the final pretrial order. See Complaint at 7; First 
Amended Complaint at 4; Joint Final Pretrial Order at 1. 
 
In asserting an action under the Jones Act, a plaintiff can 
elect to sue either under admiralty jurisdiction or at law 
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invoking federal question jurisdiction. See Yates v. Dann, 
223 F.2d 64, 66 (3d Cir. 1955); 14 Charles Alan Wright & 
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure   3677 at 
492 (Supp. 1997). Accordingly, because the Foulks' original 
complaint alleged jurisdiction under the Jones Act, it stated 
a claim potentially cognizable under either admiralty or 
non-admiralty jurisdiction. However, the complaint did not 
mention specifically Rule 9(h) or 28 U.S.C. 1333; 
therefore, while the Foulks plainly invoked the court's 
diversity jurisdiction, it is unclear whether in addition they 
intended to invoke the court's admiralty jurisdiction or 
whether they chose to rely on the court's federal question 
jurisdiction. When the Foulks amended their complaint to 
eliminate the Jones Act claim, this action also eliminated 
any potential federal question jurisdiction; but the 
jurisdictional question remained unclear, because they still 
could rely on two possible bases for jurisdiction, i.e., 
admiralty and diversity jurisdiction. 
 
In discussing the language in a complaint necessary to 
invoke admiralty jurisdiction in cases with multiple possible 
bases for jurisdiction, we have held that "[t]o invoke 
admiralty jurisdiction . . . a plaintiff must affirmatively 
insert a statement in the pleadings identifying the claim as 
an `admiralty or maritime claim.' " Fedorczyk v. Caribbean 
Cruise Lines, LTD, 82 F.3d 69, 73 (3d Cir. 1996); see also 
Bryan v. Associated Container Transp., 837 F. Supp. 633, 
641-42 (D.N.J. 1993) (holding that the claim was based on 
diversity jurisdiction and not maritime jurisdiction in part 
because the party did not specifically invoke maritime 
jurisdiction under Rule 9(h)). However, beyond this 
statement, we did not provide any guidance in Fedorczyk 
instructive here; thus, it is appropriate to examine 
decisions of other courts that have confronted this problem 
to determine what our rule should be. 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has crafted a 
liberal rule regarding the language necessary to elect 
admiralty jurisdiction under Rule 9(h). See T.N.T. Marine 
Serv., Inc. v. Weaver Shipyards & Dry Docks, Inc., 702 F.2d 
585, 587-88 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that an allegation that 
"[t]his is also a suit for breach of a maritime contract and 
for maritime tort" was sufficient to invoke admiralty 
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jurisdiction). Under this rule, the complaint does not have 
to mention Rule 9(h) specifically, see Bodden v. Osgood, 
879 F.2d 184, 186 (5th Cir. 1989); instead, the complaint 
only need contain "a simple statement asserting admiralty 
or maritime claims." Teal v. Eagle Fleet, Inc., 933 F.2d 341, 
345 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting T.N.T. Marine, 702 F.2d at 
588). However, not every complaint that contains 
allegations relating to admiralty should be considered to 
have invoked admiralty jurisdiction. Instead, courts must 
look to the "totality of the circumstances" of the case. 
Bodden, 879 F.2d at 186. 
 
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit also has held 
that the mention of Rule 9(h) is not required. In Concordia 
Co. v. Panek, 115 F.3d 67, 72 (1st Cir. 1997), the court 
held that to invoke admiralty jurisdiction, "the preferred 
technique is to invoke expressly Rule 9(h)," but the court 
did not require litigants to do so. Instead, the court 
examined the pleadings, which stated that the claim was 
"In Admiralty," and concluded that this language was 
sufficient to invoke admiralty jurisdiction in light of the fact 
that the litigant did not demand a jury trial. Id. 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has not 
adopted such a liberal rule, but it also has not required the 
specific mention of Rule 9(h). In Trentacosta v. Frontier Pac. 
Aircraft Indus., Inc., 813 F.2d 1553, 1559 (9th Cir. 1987), 
the amended complaint contained a claim seeking relief 
under the "Jones Act and General Maritime Law." The 
amended complaint did not invoke admiralty jurisdiction; 
instead, the plaintiff "was careful to invoke federal 
jurisdiction only under 28 U.S.C.  1331." Id. The court 
held that such language was insufficient to invoke 
admiralty jurisdiction, because the plaintiff elected only to 
invoke jurisdiction under the "law" side rather than on the 
"admiralty side." Id.; see generally Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. 
United States Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Wash., 698 F.2d 
967, 972 n.2 (9th Cir. 1983) (reasoning that requiring a 
statement specifically mentioning Rule 9(h) to invoke 
admiralty jurisdiction seems to be the correct rule, but 
holding that the court did not need to reach the question). 
Thus, even though the court did not require the specific 
mention of Rule 9(h), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
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Circuit seems to have adopted a stricter pleading standard 
than the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and First Circuits. 
 
Although the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has 
not ruled on this issue, a number of district courts within 
that circuit have required the specific mention of Rule 9(h) 
in order to invoke admiralty jurisdiction in cases with 
multiple bases for jurisdiction. See Lewis v. United States, 
812 F. Supp. 620, 628 (E.D. Va. 1993) (requiring a specific 
mention of Rule 9(h)); see also Banks v. Hanover Steamship 
Corp., 43 F.R.D. 374, 376-77 (D. Md. 1967) (requiring a 
specific statement of admiralty jurisdiction). Thus, these 
rulings have established the strictest standard among the 
federal courts that have addressed this issue. 
 
After reviewing these cases and the specific facts of this 
case, I would hold that we should be somewhat exacting in 
our view of the pleadings with regards to invoking admiralty 
jurisdiction in cases involving more than one potential 
jurisdictional base. While under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure "[n]o technical forms of pleading or motions are 
required," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1), it is important for a 
plaintiff to alert the district court that he or she intends to 
invoke the court's admiralty jurisdiction. If the plaintiff 
wishes to invoke admiralty jurisdiction and its 
accompanying procedures in a case involving more than 
one potential jurisdictional base, the plaintiff should be 
required to state specifically that the claim is "an admiralty 
or maritime claim within in the meaning of Rule 9(h)."5 
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure  1313 at 719 (2d ed. 1990). As Professor 
Thomas J. Schoenbaum has stated: 
 
       If, however, the claim is cognizable not only in 
       admiralty but also on some other ground of federal 
       jurisdiction (such as diversity), the pleader is put to an 
       election whether to invoke the special admiralty 
       procedures and remedies. To plead an admiralty or 
       maritime claim in such a case, the pleading must, in 
       addition to the admiralty jurisdictional allegations, 
       contain an identifying statement (or its equivalent) as 
       follows: This is an admiralty or maritime claim within 
       the meaning of Rule 9(h). If this identifying statement is 
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       not made, the claim may be treated as a non-maritime 
       civil action. 
 
Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law 
 21-1 at 467 (2d ed. 1994) (emphasis in original) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 
This case, of course, involves the precise situation which 
Schoenbaum describes. Application of the rule as set forth 
by Schoenbaum would place the court and the other 
litigants on notice that the plaintiff intends to invoke the 
admiralty jurisdiction of the district court. Such a rule 
requiring the complaint to mention Rule 9(h) is not unduly 
harsh, as the plaintiff can control the situation completely 
with his or her pleadings. Because the Foulks failed to 
mention Rule 9(h), I would hold that they did not make the 
required election under that rule and therefore would 
dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
 
In holding that no such statement is required, the 
majority relies on the language of Rule 9(h) (emphasis 
added) which provides: 
 
       A pleading or count setting forth a claim for relief 
       within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction that is 
       also within the jurisdiction of the district court on 
       some other ground may contain a statement identifying 
       the claim as an admiralty or maritime claim for the 
       purposes of Rules 14(c), 38(e), 82, and the 
       Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and 
       Maritime Claims. . . . 
 
The majority contends that the use of the word "may" 
demonstrates that specific invocation of Rule 9(h) is not 
necessary; however, in my view this argument is 
unfounded. This aspect of Rule 9(h) describes a case where, 
as here, a party may invoke multiple potential bases for 
jurisdiction--admiralty jurisdiction and one or more other 
jurisdictional bases, i.e., federal question or diversity 
jurisdiction. Specifically, after the filing of the first amended 
complaint, the Foulks could rely on diversity jurisdiction as 
an alternative to admiralty jurisdiction. In this dual or 
multiple jurisdictional setting, Rule 9(h) does not require 
plaintiffs to invoke admiralty jurisdiction; instead, it 
provides them with a choice--they can rely either on 
 
                                19 
admiralty jurisdiction or another jurisdictional ground. The 
use of the word "may" in Rule 9(h) refers to this choice. 
 
Plaintiffs "may" invoke admiralty jurisdiction or in an 
appropriate case they may chose to rely on federal question 
or diversity jurisdiction. To do the latter, they merely do not 
invoke Rule 9(h). Thus, contrary to the majority's reasoning, 
the specific wording in Rule 9(h), particularly the use of 
"may," leads to the conclusion that a plaintiff specifically 
must invoke the court's admiralty jurisdiction for the case 
to be in admiralty if it is otherwise within the jurisdiction 
of the district court. "May" simply means that when both 
admiralty and other jurisdictional bases are available, the 
plaintiff has the option to select admiralty jurisdiction. See 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9 advisory committee's note (1966 
Amendment) (noting that after the unification of the rules of 
procedure, "the pleader must be afforded some means of 
designating his claim as the counterpart of the present suit 
in admiralty, where its character as such is not clear."). 
"May" surely does not mean that a plaintiff can select 
admiralty jurisdiction either expressly or covertly and leave 
the court and the other parties guessing as to the plaintiff's 
intentions. 
 
Even using the more liberal standard of the majority, I 
would not hold that the Foulks, in fact, did invoke 
admiralty jurisdiction in view of the totality of the 
circumstances involved in this case. Here, as was true of 
the plaintiff in Trentacosta, the Foulks were careful not to 
invoke admiralty jurisdiction under Rule 9(h). Instead, the 
original complaint referred to the Jones Act and federal 
diversity jurisdiction, and specifically did not mention 
admiralty jurisdiction. After all, to say, as did the Foulks, 
that the "jurisdiction of this Court arises under Admiralty 
law as modified by the Jones Act" is not to invoke admiralty 
jurisdiction because, as I set forth above, a Jones Act case 
can be brought in the district court without invoking 
admiralty jurisdiction. What the Foulks did not say is that 
they are bringing the case invoking the admiralty 
jurisdiction of the district court. The Foulks' first amended 
complaint did not clarify the situation for while they did 
allege that the court's jurisdiction "arises under the 
Admiralty law," they also invoked the court's diversity 
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jurisdiction; and cases under admiralty law can be brought 
in a district court under its diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g., 
Continental Cas. Co. v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 605 
F.2d 1340, 1344 (5th Cir. 1979) ("A maritime issue may be 
raised in a diversity suit; this is one significance of the 
savings-to-suitors clause, 28 U.S.C.  1333, which permits 
a litigant to obtain federal jurisdiction over, and jury 
resolution of, an admiralty question by invoking federal 
jurisdiction on an independent basis."). Thus, this language 
in the first amended complaint could be interpreted as 
relying solely on diversity jurisdiction and not intending to 
rely on admiralty jurisdiction at all. I emphasize that the 
Foulks did not specify that they were bringing the case 
under the court's admiralty jurisdiction; and therefore, the 
majority is wrong when it indicates that the "Foulks alleged 
both diversity and admiralty jurisdiction." Slip Opinion at 
3. 
 
Furthermore, the Foulks requested a jury trial on the 
issues contained in the complaint. Such a request is 
inconsistent with admiralty jurisdiction, and it lends 
credence to the conclusion that the plaintiff conceived of 
the claim as being at law rather than under the district 
court's admiralty jurisdiction. See Concordia, 115 F.3d at 
72 ("One important factor in determining whether a 
claimant has elected to proceed in admiralty is whether he 
demanded a jury trial."); Sanders v. Seal Fleet, Inc., 1998 
WL 136097, *4-5 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 23, 1998) (holding that 
the action was under the court's federal question rather 
than admiralty jurisdiction, because the plaintiff demanded 
a jury trial and his complaint invoked the court's 
jurisdiction under the Jones Act and general maritime law 
rather than specifically pleading Rule 9(h)); see also In re 
Consolidation Coal, 123 F.3d at 132 (noting that " `[t]here is 
no right to a jury in actions instituted in admiralty' " 
(citation omitted)). Are we to believe that insofar as the 
Foulks invoked diversity jurisdiction they are entitled to a 
jury trial while at the same time for the same claim they are 
entitled to a bench trial in admiralty? As far as I am 
concerned, the Foulks did not invoke admiralty jurisdiction, 
and I therefore would dismiss the appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
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To support its determination, the majority cites the 
pretrial order and Donjon's Rule 14(c) motion as evidence of 
the Foulks' selection of admiralty jurisdiction. However, this 
evidence is unpersuasive. First, the pretrial order did not 
restrict the court's jurisdiction only to admiralty, as the 
majority suggests. The order stated that the court's 
jurisdiction arose under "Admiralty Law as modified by the 
Jones Act 46 USC 688." In spite of the majority's 
assertion, this language does not demonstrate that the 
parties wished to invoke admiralty jurisdiction because as 
I noted previously, a plaintiff can bring claims under the 
Jones Act either in admiralty or at law. Moreover, as I 
explain below, the pretrial order discloses nothing about 
the Foulks' choice of jurisdiction. Therefore, although the 
statement in the pretrial order mentions admiralty law as 
modified by the Jones Act, in my view this reference 
demonstrates nothing useful for the issue at hand. I 
reiterate that there is no reason to assume that a case 
under "Admiralty Law as modified by the Jones Act" is 
under the admiralty jurisdiction. 
 
Second, with regard to the Rule 14(c) motion, actions by 
a defendant should not control the question of whether a 
plaintiff meant to invoke admiralty jurisdiction. It was, after 
all, Donjon and not the Foulks who brought the Jones Act 
claim to which the pretrial order refers, as the Foulks 
abandoned their Jones Act claim when they filed their first 
amended complaint. The question of what jurisdiction the 
plaintiff has invoked more properly is resolved by 
examining the pleadings and actions of the plaintiff, not the 
defendant. See generally Bryan, 837 F. Supp. at 641 ("[T]he 
application of maritime law to a plaintiff's claims is a 
matter about which a plaintiff exercises a degree of 
control."). A defendant, by filing a third party complaint 
cannot change the jurisdictional basis for a plaintiff's 
complaint. Considering all of the circumstances of the case 
and giving more weight to the pleadings and actions of the 
Foulks, this evidence regarding the Rule 14(c) motion is not 
sufficient to establish that they meant to invoke the 
admiralty jurisdiction of the district court. 
 
In a case involving both admiralty and non-admiralty 
bases of jurisdiction, if a plaintiff wishes to invoke 
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admiralty jurisdiction, he or she should be required to 
make that election in a clear statement specifically invoking 
Rule 9(h) in order to avoid procedural problems that 
otherwise could arise later, such as a dispute over whether 
there should be a jury trial or, as here, over whether a 
court of appeals has jurisdiction over an interlocutory 
appeal. Is it too much to ask that a plaintiff be clear on this 
fundamental point? The adoption of my position would 
mean that disputes of the procedural and jurisdictional 
kind involved on this appeal will become of historical 
interest only. Moreover, in view of the rather limited size of 
the admiralty bar, I am confident that a rule requiring 
specific reference to Rule 9(h) would become widely known 
to interested parties and would not become a trap for the 
unwary plaintiff, particularly because a plaintiff's failure to 
invoke Rule 9(h) is likely to preserve his or her right to a 
jury trial. I repeat, however, that even applying the liberal 
rule utilized by the majority in this case, I would hold that 
the Foulks have not invoked the admiralty jurisdiction of 
the district court. 
 
As a result of the majority's opinion, the Foulks face a 
problem that they may not recognize they have. Both of the 
complaints and the final pretrial order preserved their 
demand for a jury trial, and presumably the parties were 
ready to proceed on that basis. However, prior to trial, 
Donjon filed this appeal, in which the Foulks joined, in 
response to the district court's partial grant of summary 
judgment. In assuming jurisdiction over this interlocutory 
appeal, the majority finds that this case rests on the 
admiralty jurisdiction of the court. As a result, presumably 
the Foulks have lost any right to a jury trial. 1 Based on 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The majority specifically does not reach this question, instead stating 
that this issue will have to be decided "at a later date" in reliance on 
the 
"relevant legal precedent including Fitzgerald v. United States Line Co., 
83 S.Ct. 1646 (1963) and Haskins v. Point Towing Co., 395 F.2d 737 (3d 
Cir. 1968)." Slip Opinion at 14 n.7. While I agree that such a 
determination will have to be made in the future, the result is 
preordained and neither Fitzgerald nor Haskins will help the Foulks to 
preserve their jury trial demand. Both Fitzgerald and Haskins involved 
Jones Act claims brought at law that had been coupled with other 
admiralty claims. See Haskins, 395 F.2d at 739-41. Because the Jones 
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their consistent demands for a jury trial, I cannot believe 
that the Foulks intended to abandon that request. In the 
circumstances, the Foulks by joining in this appeal may 
have brought about a classic operation of the doctrine of 
unintended consequences. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the interlocutory appeal 
should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Therefore, I 
respectfully dissent. 
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Act claim had been brought at law, and not in admiralty, the plaintiffs 
were entitled to receive a jury trial as to all issues, including the 
pendent 
maritime claims. However, this case is fundamentally different, because 
the majority has determined that the Foulks' claims arose under the 
admiralty jurisdiction of the court. As we pointed out in Haskins "the 
Jones Act has been construed to permit a Jones Act claim for negligence 
to be maintained as an independent admiralty action." Id. at 741. Since 
this case is governed solely by the court's admiralty jurisdiction rather 
than an alternative non-admiralty basis for jurisdiction such as existed 
in Fitzgerald and Haskins, the Foulks cannot rely on that precedent to 
demand a jury trial.                               
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